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Abstract: The technical rationality (TR) and reflective practice (RP) paradigms have
heavily influenced thinking about design and design cognition in the 20th century. This
paper concisely highlights some of the features and limitations of these paradigms. In
particular, it develops the suggestion that we require a new “root metaphor” or leading set of concepts to develop our thinking about designing beyond the work of Donald
Schön. Building on this assumption, this paper examines some useful aspects of selected concepts developed by Gilbert Simondon, in particular the notion of ontogenesis. Furthermore, it is argued that Simondon’s thought helps us to connect epistemology to the fluidity of lived experience. The suggestion is made that a so-called ontogenetic approach is better suited to deal with the inevitable fluidity and developmental
character of experience itself, and that this could be new approach for thinking about
design processes.
Keywords: reflection-in-action; design cognition; ontogenesis; epistemology

1. Introduction
Knowledge claims about design situations are usually made from an immersed perspective,
informed by lived experience. Nowhere else is this explained more clearly than in the work
of Donald Schön (Schön 1983; Schön 1992). While Schön emphasized the importance of lived
experience in reflectively judging design situations, his account left untheorized how (a) experience and epistemology interact, and (b) how development of a knowledge base is dependent on a prior account of how experience develops. If we have a reasonable picture of
how design experience develops and relates to the accumulation of knowledge, we might fill
in the gap that Schön identified.
Schön’s ideas have reached the status of “root metaphors” that underlie thinking about design as such, because they form an indispensable part of an established canon of ideas. A
root metaphor is a structuring image or analogy that forms the base for an entire line of theorizing. (Pepper 1942). Pepper’s own example is that of the Presocratic philosopher Thales,
who postulated that everything in the world resembles water. The root metaphor “water” is
used to explain, theorize about and characterize phenomena in the physically real world
(Pepper 1942, p. 92-93). As such, it is an underlying image or thought-shaper (Hanna and
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Paans 2021) that shapes and directs thinking. But equally, it gives rise to deeply set habits of
thought, some of which are constraining rather than helpful.
Schön’s “reflection-in-action” was a genuine novel approach, but the danger of clinging too
closely to a root metaphor is that its weaknesses are overlooked and only seldomly questioned.
In this paper, I raise the suggestion that we require a new “root metaphor” or model for
thinking about design processes, and in particular how knowledge accrues in them. This
new root metaphor is centred around the concept of “ontogenesis”, informed by the work
of the French philosopher of technology Gilbert Simondon (1924–1989).
Immediately, we must address a critical question: what problem does this new root metaphor solve? Put concisely, it is the issue of a blind spot in the way that the development of
experience in design processes and design cognition has been theorized under the influence
of successive research paradigms in design theory. Schön’s 1983 study The Reflective Practitioner (Schön 1983) demonstrated the dependence of design insights on experience but left
the development of experience itself undeveloped. This is of crucial importance for design
epistemology. One way in which this problem surfaces is the role than verbalization plays in
Schön’s account. After reading Schön, one could almost come away with the idea that everything important about a design process could be verbalized and discussed between competent professionals. However, this picture is not entirely accurate. Emotions, affects and
sheer “gut feeling” cannot easily be verbalized, but they play decisive formative roles in designing. Indeed, the picture that Schön paints about architectural education and the role studio practice is sometimes one-dimensional, overemphasizing exchanges in the studio,
thereby unwittingly reinforcing the idea of the designer as the sketcher who “massages”
problems until inspiration strikes (Ó Catháin and Mann 2009).
Epistemological claims often refer to the conditions under which a given insight or piece of
knowledge was obtained, emphasised by approaches like contextualism (Ball 2017; Pynn
2015). As such, the notion of lived experience becomes of crucial importance if we are to
evaluate knowledge claims with sufficient clarity and precision. As experience is an occurrent and organically developing phenomenon, the accompanying epistemology must reflect
something of this growth process. In claiming this, we follow a line of thinking that stresses
the fact that the models utilized to address a given question must follow the phenomenon
under examination. Put differently: applying a generic model to a specific question leads often to conceptual problems and mismatches.
Therefore, in section 2, I explicate some key characteristics of the technical rationality (TR)
and reflective practice (RP) paradigms. This exposition should be read as a synoptic analysis
of a selection of core concepts that structure our thinking about design.
In section 3, I sketch out a new root metaphor, intended as a model for renewed thinking
about design activity. This root metaphor centres on the notion of “ontogenesis”, derived
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from the thought of Gilbert Simondon. I explain its features and advantages and show how it
may be used to move beyond the limitations of the TR and RP paradigms.
In the concluding section 4, I sketch some developmental possibilities of the ontogenetic
root metaphor, although my account cannot be complete or exhaustive.

2. Two root metaphors of design processes
The perennial predicament for every form of thinking is that it must start from some presuppositions. Nowhere is this better visible than in the scientific paradigms used as models to
think about designing during the second half of the 20th century.
The technical rationality (TR) paradigm utilized during the 1960s and 1970s was in the early
1980s superseded by the reflective practitioner (RP) paradigm, introduced by Donald Schön
(Schön 1983). In turn, the insights formulated by Schön fed into the developing design science from the 1990s and the early 2000s (Buchanan 1992; Cross 2007; Dorst 2003; Erlhoff
2013; Lawson 2004, 2005).
If we wish to retrace the roots of the TR paradigm, we must start after the Second World
War, when developments in mathematics, logic and the emerging computer sciences deeply
influenced views on human problem solving. This development mirrored an unbridled confidence in the dual doctrines of logically-driven mathematization (exemplified in the work of
John von Neumann, Norbert Wiener, John Nash, and the MIT/Princeton research axis) and
natural mechanism (the doctrine that all physical reality can be approached as more-or-less
complex automata, all of whose operations and quantitative properties can be calculated on
an ideal digital computer).
Building on the twin ideas of natural mechanism and logic-driven mathematization, design
processes were largely framed as decision-sequences during the 1960s and 1970s (Hanna
and Paans, 2020). The core idea was that design decisions were utilized to explore a given
problem space, and that the sum total of decisions constituted a rational design process. Allen Newell even regarded the problem space as the “fundamental category” of design (Newell 1979). Here, we see the root metaphor “mechanism” at work. (Pepper 1942, p. 186–188).
If the world is framed as a machine, and when biological organisms are framed as complex
automata, then it is only a small step to regard the brain as a supercomputer, and to frame
thinking processes as computing (or computable) processes. With this commitment to mechanism, emerges a propensity to cling to what Buchanan (1985, p. 9) has called “technological
reasoning”. That is, the type of reasoning that focuses on the instrumental and technical values of design practice.
This methodological choice reduces design activity to mere problem solving, and consequently questions about the nature of problems emerge. After all, to solve a problem, one
must define it. This issue gave rise to an extensive literature. However, notions like “wicked
problems” (Rittel and Webber 1973), “ill-structured problems” (Goel 1992a, 1992b, 1992c;
Simon 1973), “superwicked problems” (Levin et al. 2012) and “anarchic nets” (de Bruyn and
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Reuter 2011) did little to answer the original issue: how can one solve a problem that is not
clearly demarcated?
One promising response was to regard problems as decomposable entities: through careful
analysis, a given problem could be disassembled in its constitutive parts. Simultaneously, this
idea gave rise to its natural counterpart: if ideas consisted of simple parts, designing
amounted to assembling discrete components (Asimow 1962; Bamford 2002, p. 252). But
the idealization of technological reasoning proved to be constraining for thinking about design.
A breakthrough in this impasse was Dorst’s observation that problems and solutions coevolve (Dorst 2003). In one gesture, the relation between a problem and a response was redefined as a process of mutual definition and dynamic demarcation. Likewise, Buchanan’s
concept of “placement” proposed that designers utilize a preliminary orientation towards an
issue or set of issues that must be addressed (Buchanan 1992). The placement applies as it
were background knowledge in rough-and-ready approach that fixes a point of departure.
Both Buchanan’s and Dorst’s approaches rejected from the strict distinction of problem definition and solution.
Conversely, the TR paradigm treated human problem-solvers largely as rational optimizers, a
kind of idealized homo economicus. This idea had already gained intellectual respectability in
the work of philosophical positivism and the CIAM-styled modernistic approach to architecture alike. (Paans 2019b; Hanna and Paans 2020). In the TR-paradigm, the designer makes
crucial distinctions and gradually narrows down an impossibly large array of choices and options (Kunz and Rittel 1972; Rittel 2014). Conversely, these bits and pieces are synthesized in
variations that each respond to an initial problem. In subsequent cycles of evaluation, the
options are once again weighed, and new cycles of targeted analysis or synthesis are initiated.
In this picture, sociological, affective, emotive and practical aspects of design are curiously
absent. We are left with the question what kind of role lived experience actually plays for
the designer, especially against the background of Buchanan’s assessment that design arguments derive their substance from technological reasoning, character and emotion (Buchanan 1985, p. 9). But if the focus is only on the first aspect, this result in an obvious lacuna:
The argument in each is only partly controlled by mechanical premises, and if the logos
or reasoning of the design is reduced to mechanics alone, the designer's real argument, which is a unique synthesis of mechanical and human premises, is lost. (Buchanan 1985, p. 10–11).

This lacuna prepared the ground of Schön’s contribution to design theory. Before delving
into the RP paradigm, it suffices to highlight two further points about the TR paradigm:
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1. In the TR paradigm, design processes are conceptualized as sequences of consecutive decisions (Buchanan 1995, p. 43). These moments are connected by episodes of analysis, evaluation and synthesis. One would be justified in asking
whether this depiction is not a post hoc idealization. A sequence of stages is suggestive of clear demarcations, while reality itself is inevitably more fluid.
2. In the TR paradigm, the accumulation of insights is confined to fixed points in
the design process; for instance, a demarcated moment of “evaluation” leads
supposedly to new insights, and these are consequently utilized in an episode of
“synthesis”. In reality, uncovering insights is an occurrent phenomenon due to
the fact that experience unfolds continuously and non-linearly.
Schön coined two instrumental ideas: (1) the idea that designers develop a design proposal
“in conversation” with the situation, and (2) the idea that designers utilize “reflection-in-action” to accomplish this. The influence of this approach can still be witnessed in notions like
epistemic dissonance (Farias 2013), serial sketching, linkography (Goldtschmidt 1991; 2014)
and discursive pragmatics (Girard and Stark 2002).
Schön’s method consists in glimpsing over the shoulder of the designer at work and connecting the moves she makes to her notional world. This is a far cry from the abstract, processoriented nature of the TR paradigm, as it opens up towards the first-person viewpoint of the
designer and the tactics she deploys. The case that is usually cited takes place in a design
studio, between an architecture teacher (Quist) and his student (Petra) who encounters a
design problem. In responding, Quist thinks aloud while simultaneously drawing sketches
that represent his thoughts, visually and spatially reframing the problem she presented him.
During the conversation, whenever Quist encounters a problem, he starts to sketch, specifying leading ideas or generating alternatives for issues. However, this generation of alternatives is not just a heuristic exercise in technical reasoning.
If anything, it is the organic development of a “thick” language game spanning across visual,
emotive and grammatical modes of expression. Because the resulting language consists of a
combination of verbal utterances and non-verbal media such as sketches or models, it is
richer in expression than purely linguistic structures. It is “semantically saturated” – i.e. open
to different interpretations simultaneously and sequentially (Lawson 2004, p. 76; Suwa and
Tversky 2003). But above all, it is somewhat opaque and open-ended, so that new interpretations can be “read into it” or derived from it.
The exploratory logic of the designer at work has often an “if…then” form. For example, if we
choose to make a certain area of the city car-free, then we will see an increase in the use of
public transport. These “if-then” statements are essentially conjectures, but simultaneously
playful speculations, or precise investigations of a single issue. The activity of “free conjecturing” opens out onto experience, a point I will return to in the next section.
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Schön’s contribution lies in moving away from the abstract, decision-theoretic approach of
the TR paradigm, focusing instead on the direct experience of designers as they design. However, it left a gap for design epistemology as experience is by definition fluid, developing and
unstable, while models are fixed, abstract and of a sometimes overidealizing nature.
That being said, the discourse about design knowledge is no stranger to the idea of instability. Confronted with the apparent lack of standards and plurality of notions, Wolfgang Jonas
once stated that designers must embrace the instability and must learn to “love the swamp
of uncertainty” (Jonas 2013). True as that advice may be for the practitioner, it gives preciously little handholds to the academic who aims to set up epistemological reference
points. However, by considering a selection of concepts from the work of Gilbert Simondon
and adapting them as thinking tools for the design discourse, we might find our way out of
the swamp.

3. Ontogenesis: The nature of experience
To move our thinking about design processes beyond Schön, we require models that focus
on the unfolding of experience. But then, such models require an underlying “root metaphor” suited to deal with instability, impermanence, fluidity and developmental patterns. So,
the very first task is to come up with a new conceptualization of design processes, notably
one that can give rise to models that address fluidity and instability.
The new root metaphor must therefore:
1. adequately represent the fluid nature of design experience, by not framing it
solely in terms of rational decision-taking (as in TR) or competent (professional)
verbalizing, judging and reflection (as in RP).
2. recognize the conjunctive character of experience (James 1904). Simply put, we
seldom experience only one thing at a time. We hear the keyboard under our
fingers, the rain against the window and we see the glow of the lamp on the
desk. All these features enter our consciousness at slightly different time intervals, but we experience them as being part of the same scene or part of a coherent, continuous and intelligible experience.
Our brains possess the capacity to update this rich, conjunctive texture in real-time as we
move our gaze or change position (Dennett 2003). The separate impressions that make up
the tapestry of our experience are perceived as spontaneously forming relations with each
other in the so-called “mental workspace” (Baars 1996, 1997; Dehaene 2014, pp. 163–165).
If they did not, our experience would be a rather chaotic. Professional training shapes this
integrative capacity. For instance, a landscape architect or engineer might read things in a
landscape that elude the innocent onlooker:
The gaze of the construction engineer surveys the landscape and recognizes that a certain valley may be crossed by a bridge with a large overarching structure, while a landscape planner appreciates the silence and untouched beauty of the same situation as
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its most valuable characteristic, and an architect imagines how beautifully embedded
his settlement design would look in the same valley…(De Bruyn and Reuter 2011, p.
89).

The landscape architect or engineer combines features of her experience with technical
knowledge. Consequently, entities like bridges or electricity lines appear to her not just as
nondescript, generic entities, but as technical objects. This feature holds for finished objects,
just as much for objects that are being designed. Objects that are represented in the course
of a design processes are “fictional objects” or analogons – that is, the affective and imaginative counterparts that support, shape and inform our experience. (Currie 1990, 1995; Sartre 2004, p. 61–69).
The TR paradigm often skimmed lightly over these affective and emotive characteristics of
designing, even while it is obvious that “eureka moments” and episodes of frustration are
part and parcel of it. Affective factors like surprise, enthusiasm and idealism are just as much
influences as rational motives. While the RP paradigm recognized the importance of the interplay between designer and artefact, it said little about the first-person nature of experience, emphasizing “competent judgement” by the designer instead. But it is the fluency and
conjunctive character of first-person, embodied experience that makes reflective judgements possible. Consequently, RP elucidates individual operations by which knowledge is acquired but cannot provide a theoretical base for it.
Epistemologically, this presents a problem, as individual observations on reflective design
practice – no matter how useful – do not automatically coalesce into a theory. If we structure all discrete observations in a coherent framework, we remain stuck at the level of defining practical design rules, without knowing why they work. Conversely, if we take the conjunctive character of experience as point of departure, we circumvent this problem.
For a richer image or “root metaphor” that takes lived experience and its developmental influence fully into account, I examine some concepts by Gilbert Simondon. It should be emphasized that the focus of this discussion is restricted, and that the thought of Simondon obviously extends well beyond the concepts discussed here.
Initially, Simondon developed the notion of ontogenesis for describing the nature of technological development. He noticed that technical objects like the combustion engine could be
fruitfully analysed by taking their genesis into account, including problems and issues that
were inherited from one model to the next. But equally, he noticed that the way in which individual parts acted determined and were determined by their environment. Significantly
differing from cybernetic models by McLuhan and Wiener, Simondon held that the key to
the problem of development was not (just) located in how information was distributed in a
process of decision-making (or reflectively judging), but that it could be approached from
the angle of genealogical-ontological development, an approach he termed ontogenesis:
The term “ontogenesis” receives its full sense if, instead of giving it the restricted and
derived meaning of the genesis of the individual (in opposition to a greater genesis:
that of the species for example), one uses it to designate the character of becoming of

7

Otto Paans

being, that by which being becomes, insofar as it is, as being. The opposition between
being and becoming can only be valid within a certain doctrine that supposes that the
very model of being is a substance (Simondon 2009, p. 5–6).

Although his terminology differs, Simondon comes surprisingly close to Schön’s account of
progress in design processes, as reflective practice is a recognition of the fluid and unstable
character of design activity. But Simondon provides an additional step that extends Schön’s
initial argument: he introduces the notion of ontogenesis into the process of becoming. That
is, he provides an account of the “becoming of being” and is therefore in a position to think
systematically about the seemingly ungraspable fluidity of experience. Instead of focusing on
the sequence of decisions or judgements, Simondon takes a broader view, and views the developmental process as an organic whole.
To bridge the gap between the Platonic realms of being and becoming, Simondon coins the
neologism metastability:
[Simondon] claims that in antiquity (…) there were only the presupposed notions of
instability and stability, or movement and rest, but nothing that existed in between or
beyond these concepts. Thus, to consider being was to consider an implicit state of
stability. (Bluemink 2020; Simondon 2009, p. 6).
In its most basic formulation, metastability refers to a state that transcends the classical distinction between stability and instability. Deleuze summarises that “what essentially defines a metastable system is the existence of a ‘disparation,’ the existence of at
least two different dimensions, two disparate levels of reality, between which there is
not yet any interactive communication”. In other words, a system is meta-stable in
that it is not truly stable yet not entirely unstable (Bluemink 2020; Deleuze 2013, p.
89).

So, instead of accepting the Platonic opposition between becoming (dynamic) and Being
(static), Simondon collapses the dichotomy, and considers the in-between realm that connects the two. The upshot is that systems do not need to be either stable or unstable. They
can be open and in development, and we can accept that as a constitutive property of them.
If we apply this thought to design practice, Simondon’s abstract formulation of metastability
turns out to be quite accurate description of objects that are being designed. Such objects
are stable in the sense that some of their properties are fixed or retained during successive
cycles of development. Yet, they are also unstable because that they are open and actually
developing (Whyte and Ewenstein 2010; Bardin 2015: 56). Artefacts curiously unite stability
and instability in a single metastable entity.
By collapsing the distinction between being and becoming, Simondon suggests that to become is continuous with being. We tend to equate being with stability and becoming with
instability or flux. But once we think of these notions as continuous, we can see how this
move enables Simondon to claim that objects and individuals alike are naturally shot
through with potentiality, but equally with relationality. Some of their aspects are stable,
while some others are simultaneously unstable. But at any moment, a designer might
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change this fragile order. And exactly in that metastability lies the possibility to capitalize on
as yet unrealized potentials.
For designers, the notion of potentiality is familiar. A design process can be seen as a series
of attempts to discover and realize potentials that reside in an initial idea. Ideas can develop
and influence their surroundings in many ways; in turn, their surroundings shape them. Simondon calls this the pre-individual component of an entity: an object or entity may exist as
an inchoate mass of potentials, but only once these potentials crystallize into something tangible, something truly individual emerges.
So, the metastable entity can be seen as a field of potentials that can developed in various
directions, but that at the same time possesses a homeostatic (i.e. dynamic) balance:
All these elements, however, participate in a ground that gives (…) a homeostatic
unity, and which acts as a vehicle for informed energy from one to the other and
among all of them. (…) This ground is the mental milieu associated with the forms. It is
the middle term between life and conscious thought, just as the associated milieu of
the technical object is the middle term between natural world and the fabricated
structures of the technical object. We can create technical beings because we have
within us a play of relations and a matter-form relation that is highly analogous to the
one we constitute in the technical object (Simondon 2017, p. 62).

By freely moving between the realms of living and non-living entities, Simondon makes a
claim about the relation of experience to our inventive capacities. Because we possess a
“play of relations and a matter-form relation” are we able to invent and to design. (Simondon 2008). Consequently, the process of individuation cannot be understood apart from relationality, as the “limit” of the individual constitutes its interface with the external world.
But in many cases, this boundary is porous. And like the relation between individual and environment, we better understand the relation between object and context as continuous. Or
put differently, as an entanglement rather than a hard barrier.
To maintain that we possess a “play of relations and a matter-form relation” is a claim about
the nature of experience. Schön’s “reflective practitioner” is engaged in a process of retracing his steps and making judgements based on a thoroughly situated, context-sensitive
method of knowing and exploring. But, as discussed, if we restrict our theory to the level of
useful practical observations, we have made only the first step.
Simondon moves here beyond Schön’s reflection-in-action, as he maintains that (I) the nature of our experience, (II) the metastable character of artefacts, and (III) the continuity between object and context are highly analogous in nature. So, we are neither dispassionate
agents, nor competently judging professionals. Instead, we overlap and entangle with the
artefacts we design. They look a lot more like us and we look a lot more like them than the
TR and RP paradigms suggest. Simondon is insistent that the experiential dynamics we apply
in creating technical objects is reflected in them:
The dynamism of thought is the same as that of technical objects; mental schemas react upon each other during invention in the same way the diverse dynamisms of the
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technical object will react upon each other in their material functioning. (Simondon
2017, p. 60)

But even if we grant this point, how does this congruence between the dynamism of our experience and the objects it conceives play out? Another of Simondon’s concepts can be of
help to advance clarify this point, namely transduction:
By transduction we mean an operation--physical, biological, mental, social--by which
an activity propagates itself from one element to the next, within a given domain, and
founds this propagation on a structuration of the domain that is realized from place to
place: each area of the constituted structure serves as the principle and the model for
the next area, as a primer for its constitution, to the extent that the modification expands progressively at the same time as the structuring operation (Simondon 2009:
11).

The transductive “operation of propagation” is again recognizable for the designing mind. In
the literature this spontaneous-yet-directed activity goes by many names: “bridging”, “coevolving” or “structuring-solving” (Dorst and Cross 2001, p. 432; Restrepo and Christiaans
2004) “framing” (Dorst 2015) or simulating (Paans and Pasel 2020). In architectural design,
its mobile, rhizomatic and migratory properties can be witnessed in the “scale jumps” that
range from detail to overall concept to an overarching systemic vision and back again.
(Paans, 2019a).
Framing transduction as a process as either a process of rational decision-taking or competently judging is unnecessarily limiting and misleading. Likewise, designing is definitely more
than either decision-making or judging. Instead, it has more in common with an immersive
performance in which no structure is taken as primary, but in which each thought, leitmotif,
system or structure can be taken as point of departure for targeted experimentation. As
some elements of an idea or object serve as “primers” for new elements, we can say that
acts of modifying are simultaneously actions of dynamically structuring the various components of an idea. Each change brings new potentials and relations into the foreground.
Sometimes, these changes are deliberately planned through professional judgement. But
just as often, such changes occur as flukes, surprises or unintended side effects.
The affective, emotive, technical and rational capacities of the human mind all play roles in
gradually conceiving artefacts, objects and ideas. However, the process of form-seeking or
form-defining is centred on “signifying form”:
[t]he Good Form is no longer the simple form, the pregnant geometric form, but the
signifying form, that is, that which establishes a transductive order within a system of
reality that contains potentials. This good form is that which maintains the energy level
of the system, that which conserves its potentials by rendering them compatible: good
form is structure of compatibility and viability, it is the dimensionality that is invented
and according to which there is compatibility without degradation (Simondon 2009:
11).

The form is not the physical appearance, that aesthetically pleasing object, or that all-encompassing “master idea” that solves all practical problems. And neither is it the “primary
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generator” that artificially superimposes a structure on a given problem (Darke 1978). Instead, the form is that tangible order which emerges through the various registers of embodied experience, and large parts of which are non-conceptual, affective and open-ended.
Equally, the “signifying form” is not a symbol that signifies a reality beyond itself. Instead, it
is the appearance of the tangible order that creates a “shock of recognition”, a moment in
which the designer realizes that there is a deep and thoroughgoing congruence between the
issues she works on and the constitution of her response – an appropriateness that goes well
beyond aesthetic pleasure or functional utility (Nelson 1983, p. 10). To some degree, this
moment is implicitly expected to arrive, but when it does, its advent is often surprising – it is
the “expected unexpected” (Nelson and Stoltermann 2014: 41–42).
An excellent early example of thinking about “good form” is Kevin Lynch’s treatment of
“good city form” in his study of the same name (Lynch 1984). Instead of prescribing one definite form for the ideal city, Lynch considers a number of boundary conditions within which
the “good city” operates. What is striking is the variety and versatility of Lynch’s discussion.
In a truly genealogical manner, he traces out a network of overlapping concepts like Justice,
Access, Vitality and Efficiency, never settling for a simple formula, but bringing their relations
into the foreground.
Quite often, the design idea that provides the inroad towards a solution is still open-ended,
but it gives a direction to all subsequent developments. Conversely, it is possible to see how
often, an initial idea is in an embryonic form present in early design stages, only to change
shape later on, with an often-breathtaking versatility.

4. Conclusion
I started this paper with the assertion that Simondon’s thought could be of help in moving
beyond Schön’s account of design processes, especially by connecting epistemology to experience. Although this is not the place to provide a full Simondonian research programme, I
highlight two ways in which Simondon’s concepts can be utilized:
1. Schön’s reflective practitioner competently judges design situations and evaluates design situations, but we obtain little information on how this capacity develops over time. Like “decision-taking” in the TR paradigm, “reflection-in-action” has a limited scope of application. By contrast, Simondon’s concept of
transduction shows how the designing mind utilizes a “propagating activity” that
freely moves across various elements. Combined with the claim that we possess
an inherent affinity for inventing “matter-form” relations, we have a powerful
set of conceptual tools to create a new theoretical framework for designing. If
we follow the Simondonian line of thought, we start from the fluidity of experience, which translates into a “propagating activity” with which we explore design situations through “thick semantics”, ratiocination, affect, emotion and immersion. Instead of starting from a mediating concept like “decision-taking” or
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“reflection-in-action”, we stay as close to the spontaneous and multifaceted nature of experience as possible and try to derive our operative concepts from
there.
2. Epistemologically, mediating concepts like “decision-taking” or “reflection-inaction” locate the accumulation of insight at certain moments or episodes in the
process. For instance, the ideal rational optimizer of the TR paradigm “synthesizes” all prior findings into a new solution at a given moment in the process.
Likewise, an ideal “reflective practitioner” teases out various consequences of
an idea and competently judges the result in an episode of “conversing with the
situation”. Of course, such episodes might occur in design processes, but the
process in its entirety is not reducible to them. When designing, we might experience a “eureka moment” now and then, but just as often, knowledge accumulates gradually and works in a way that is transductive (i.e. freely and nonlinearly connecting ideas and fragments) and ontogenetical (i.e. genealogically integrating those fragments into new constellations). A very early insight in a design
process might re-emerge once a proposal has advanced considerably. Or, the
same idea keeps coming up again in different guises. But epistemological models derived from the TR and RP paradigms are ill-suited to represent such situations properly.
An ontogenetic account of design processes takes a different perspective: there are no overarching, idealizing models of design activity that do justice to the richness and conjunctive
character of experience. We can follow and trace out the “propagating activity” that is operative in shaping ideas and that drives the process of exploration and connection of seemingly disparate notions.
This does not mean that we must discard all foundations and that we are condemned to
wander “the swamp of uncertainty”. That would lead to an unconstrained and ultimately unhelpful relativism. Instead, it means that we must not seek handholds in mediating concepts,
but in emphasizing a full-blown, rich and layered picture of experience to discuss knowledge
claims. Once we do so, we can conceive of experience as the place (topos) where new ideas
and concepts are allowed to emerge, and knowledge accumulates in a genealogical and
transductive manner, often eluding description by models that are too static. Of course, the
suggestion raised here is concise in the extreme, but offers numerous possibilities for development.
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